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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I present a cosmopolitan case for open borders. First, I examine the U.S. 
border policy of the last several decades and challenge its cost-effectiveness and impact on 
undocumented immigrants. Then I tackle the undergirding assumption of the U.S. border policy, 
namely, that the political state is morally entitled to control its borders, by examining the most 
prominent argument on either side of the debate. In light of this discussion, I challenge the 
legitimacy of the undergirding nation-state system in our world and argue for a more global 
conception of community and world-order through the cosmopolitan accounts of the ancient 
Stoics, Immanuel Kant, and Jürgen Habermas. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The topic of immigration is among the most contentious and pressing political and 
cultural challenges today. From DACA to illegal immigration in the United States to refugee 
crises around the world, the issues around immigration and border control fill today’s headlines 
and desperately call for our collective, conscientious response as a society. In spite of its 
significance and impact on individual lives, however, the issue of immigration has been almost 
entirely neglected within the disciplines of philosophy and ethics for most of its long history, and 
only began to attract scholarly attention from philosophers and political theorists in 1980s. Given 
the current crisis around immigration today, philosophers and intellectuals have a grave 
responsibility to engage in public discourse and present moral aspects that the public may not 
easily discern or take into account. 
In this thesis, I explore some of the most important issues around immigration, from the 
U.S. border policy and the state’s right to control immigration to the nation-state system and 
cosmopolitan philosophy. I begin with a concrete and most immediate issue for us: the U.S. 
immigration and border policy. In Chapter Two, I analyze the U.S. border policy of the last 
several decades with its emphasis on border security. First, I conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
the U.S. border policy and evaluate its effectiveness against its costs and impact on various 
levels—from the national economy to undocumented immigrants. I conclude that the current 
policy of border enforcement fails the cost-benefit test. In the remainder of the chapter, I suggest 
an alternative approach that would provide a more cost-effective and humane border policy.  
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Throughout Chapter Two, I assume the conventional view of the sovereignty of the state 
over its territory. In Chapter Three, however, I will directly engage with this very assumption 
and ask, Does the state really have a right to enforce its borders? This question is important for 
two reasons: First, it deals with the most central question of the proper role of the state regarding 
its borders; and second, various pressing issues on immigration such as refugee crisis, 
undocumented immigrants, and DACA
1
 hinge on the answer to this fundamental question. In 
other words, we can decide what the appropriate collective action and public policy concerning 
these issues might be only when we can agree on the extent of which the state’s intervention can 
be legitimate.  
I will address this question by examining Michael Walzer’s case for the state’s right to 
border closure in The Spheres of Justice on the one hand and Joseph Carens’ argument for open 
borders in The Ethics of Immigration on the other. At the end of each discussion, I present my 
own critiques of the arguments. Ultimately I agree with Carens that borders should be generally 
open. Nonetheless, I have an important disagreement with his individual rights approach.  
In Chapter Four, I expand the point I made at the end of Chapter Three and examine 
some of the aspects of the nation-state system and their implications concerning the prospect of 
open borders. In light of these discussions, I argue that opening borders requires reconceiving 
our notion of community, and, for this reason, the nation-state system is at odds with open 
borders. After showing that nation-states are problematic for open border thinking, I advocate a 
cosmopolitan ethos that encourages a much larger sense of community. I argue that cosmopolitan 
conception of community is a necessary and important step toward the world with open borders.  
 
                                                 
1
 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is an immigration policy announced by President Obama in 2012, 
which provides protection from deportation and a work permit to some individuals brought to the U.S. illegally as 
minors.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND BORDER POLICY 
 
“They can build as many walls as they want. They can send as many soldiers to the border as they want, 
but a people’s need and desire for a better life is stronger.”  
– Migrant from El Salvador2 
 
  In this chapter I will explore the border policy in the United States intended to address the 
illegal immigration through the southwestern border. I will analyze and evaluate the 
consequences, both economic and moral, of border closure and enforcement efforts.
3
 In the 
course of the analysis, I will argue that U.S. border policy that focuses on the border enforcement 
fails the cost-benefit test. In its place, I will advocate a more cost-saving and humane alternative 
policy approach, one that focuses on the root causes of illegal immigration. 
 
2.1   Cost-Benefit Analysis of Border Enforcement in the United States 
 
History of Border Enforcement 
 
                                                 
2
 Nicholas Kulish, “What It Costs to Be Smuggled Across the U.S. Border,” New York Times, June 30, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/30/world/smuggling-illegal-immigration-
costs.html?action=click&module=Trending&pgtype=Article&region=Footer&contentCollection=Trending.  
 
Throughout the thesis, I will refer to unauthorized immigration mostly as either “unauthorized immigration” or 
“illegal immigration,” and unauthorized immigrants as “undocumented immigrants” for the sake of consistency. 
Also, I don’t think an individual can be “illegal”; actions can. For more on this topic, see Lauren Gambino, “‘No 
human being is illegal’: linguists argue against mislabeling of immigrants,” The Guardian, December 6, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/06/illegal-immigrant-label-offensive-wrong-activists-say. 
 
3
 In doing so, I will assume the U.S. perspective in my analysis, which means a legitimate U.S. policy considers the 
interests of American citizens first and foremost, without imposing unreasonable costs on others. For the subsequent 
chapters, however, I take a more universal standpoint.  
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  The modern form of border enforcement in the United States began as a reaction to the 
rise in illegal immigration in the mid-20
th
 century.
 
In 1964, the U.S. put an end to the Bracero 
program, an agricultural guest worker program that admitted nearly five million Mexican farm 
workers between 1942 and 1964. Although they were no longer granted the work visas that they 
had been granted under the program, Mexican workers continued to enter the country seeking 
employment opportunity. The Mexican economy at the time was not robust enough to create 
enough jobs for their citizens at home. In other words, the lack of economic opportunity and the 
ensuing poverty back home pushed many Mexican workers to make the northbound journey, 
legal or not. Primarily as a result of the change in the legal status of Mexican workers seeking 
work in the U.S., the number of immigrants crossing the border without authorization 
skyrocketed (see Figure 1). The number of apprehension at the U.S.-Mexico border increased 
tenfold in only ten years following the end of the Bracero program, from nearly 87,000 in 1965 
to about 876,000 in 1976.
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Stuart Anderson, The Impact of Agricultural Guest Worker Programs on Illegal Immigration, The National 
Foundation for American Policy, December 2003, http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/Nov_study1.pdf.  
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Figure 1. The Apprehensions Rate of the Undocumented Immigrants. Reprinted from S. 
Anderson, “The Impact of Agricultural Guest Worker Programs,” The National 
Foundation for American Policy, December 2003, 
http://www.nfap.com/researchactivities/studies/Nov_study1.pdf. 
 
The use of illegal drugs such as marijuana and heroin proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s, 
along with the public fear of drug addiction. In response, politicians from left and right promised 
to crack down on illegal drugs. They vowed to secure the southern border, through which most 
illegal drug inflow took place, passing Drug Abuse Control Act of 1965 and the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.
5
 In this context, unauthorized immigration was 
often conflated with illegal drug inflow and posed as a public health issue. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
5
 King County Bar Association Drug Policy Project, Drugs and the Drug Laws: Historical and Cultural Contexts, 
King County Bar Association, January 19, 2005, https://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/report_hc.pdf.  
 
The situation has not changed since then. In 2015, virtually all of illegal drugs in the U.S. came from Mexico 
through the southern border. Paul Bedard, “Report: Nearly all, 99.8%, of illegal drugs shipped to U.S. from 
Mexico,” Washington Examiner, November 22, 2016, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/report-nearly-all-998-
of-illegal-drugs-shipped-to-us-from-mexico.  
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presence of undocumented immigrants was presented by hardliners as evidence of weak 
governance, even a threat to the legitimacy of the country. Ronald Reagan put it, “A nation that 
cannot control its borders is not a nation.”6  
In response to the growing fears and desire to ‘protect’ our nationhood, subsequent bills 
were passed that increased border security. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 
1986 authorized a 50% increase for Border Patrol funding and personnel, and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (RIRA) of 1996 continued to increase 
funding for border enforcement. The narrative around border security took a turning point after 
the 9/11 terrorist attack, which gave rise to USA PATRIOT Act in 2001. The law created the 
Department of Homeland Security and increased the Border Patrol budget by another $300 
million. Undocumented immigrants were now associated not only with illegal drugs but also 
with terrorist attacks. In addition, border security became a top national security priority—
increasing the political momentum to support and fund border enforcement under both 
Republican and Democratic presidencies. Today, we are still living the world of a fear-based 
approach to the border, with proposals to spend more taxpaying dollars to secure the border. 
While decision-makers from left and right are complicit in the continued effort to seal the border, 
the question remains: Has the decades-old border policy in the United States that focuses on the 
border enforcement resulted in a positive net outcome?  
 
                                                 
6
 Quoted in Raymond Michalowski, “Border Militarization and Migrant Suffering: A Case of Transnational Social 
Injury,” Social Justice 34, no. 2 (2007): 70. 
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Figure 2. Border Patrol Budget, FY 1990-2016. Reprinted from "U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal 
Year Budget Statistics (FY 1990-FY 2017)," U.S. Customs and Border Protection, last 
modified December 12, 2017, https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/us-border-patrol-fiscal-
year-budget-statistics-fy-1990-fy-2017. 
 
 
Economic Costs  
U.S. spending on border security has rapidly increased over the past two decades. 
Between 2000 and 2010, U.S. taxpayers spent $90 billion on securing the U.S.-Mexico border, 
and it is estimated that since the last major overhaul of the U.S. immigration system in 1986, the 
federal government has spent an estimated $263 billion on immigration enforcement.
7
 In 2012, 
U.S. spending on immigration enforcement exceeded by 24 percent the total spending on all 
other federal criminal law enforcement agencies combined, including FBI, Drug Enforcement 
                                                 
7
 “The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security,” American Immigration Council, last modified 
January 2017, 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_cost_of_immigration_enforcement_an
d_border_security.pdf. 
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Administration, Secret Service, US Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives.
8
 As a result, the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents doubled since 
2003, and the number of ICE agents devoted to its office of Enforcement and Removal 
Operations (ERO) tripled during the same period.
9
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Southwest Border Apprehension and Border Patrol Staffing Levels,  
FY 1975-2017. Reprinted from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, "Border 
Patrol Expands But Growth Rate After 9/11 Much Less Than Before, Division Between 
North/South Border Little Changed," updated April 4, 
2006, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/143/; U.S. Border Patrol, "Border Patrol 
Agent Nationwide Staffing by Fiscal Year," accessed June 4, 
2018, www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2017-
Dec/BP%20Staffing%20FY1992-FY2017.pdf. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Doris Meissner, Donald M. Kerwin, Muzarffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the 
United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery, Migration Policy Institute, January 2013. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery 
 
9
 “The Cost of Immigration Enforcement.” 
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The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 spending bill that was just passed and signed into law in 
March granted even further 10 to 15 percent budget increase to Department of Home Security 
(DHS) from $49 billion in FY 2017 to $56 billion, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) from 
$14 billion to $16 billion, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from $6.8 billion to 
$7.5 billion. The FY 2018 budget for the Border Patrol agency remained about the same as last 
year at $4.3 billion.
10
  
One would assume that such massive outpouring of resources going into border security 
will result in some concrete positive outcome. However, the benefits have been ambiguous at 
best. The United States has spent more than $10-15 billion on border enforcement annually and 
yet still allowed an average of 500,000 new unauthorized immigrants per year between 1999 and 
2009.
11
 Data also shows that the stronger enforcement may have backfired by incentivizing 
overstay and limiting return options for undocumented immigrants thus increasing the number of 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S.
12
 
Nonetheless, proponents of a stronger border often cite the decline in illegal immigration 
through the southern border as evidence for the effectiveness of border enforcement effort. 
Indeed the number of apprehensions in May 2017 was the lowest in at least 17 years (see Figure 
3).
13
 However, economists suggest that the decline in the number of undocumented immigrants 
                                                 
10
 For more information on the breakdown of the FY 2018 Omnibus spending bill, see Christian Penichet-Paul, 
“Omnibus Appropriations for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018: Department of Homeland Security (DHS),” National 
Immigration Forum, March 29, 2018, https://immigrationforum.org/article/omnibus-appropriations-fiscal-year-fy-
2018-department-homeland-security-dhs/. 
 
11
 Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal Immigration in the United States, Migration Policy 
Institute, December 2009, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/economics-and-policy-illegal-immigration-
united-states. 
 
12
 Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,” American Journal 
of Sociology 121, no. 5 (March 2016): 1578. 
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entering the U.S. has more to do with the changes in the global economy than with the increased 
enforcement.
14
 One study shows that the difference in economic prospects in Mexico and U.S. in 
a given year, e.g., the wage gap between the two countries, is a better predictor of the number of 
Mexican undocumented immigrants entering the U.S. in the ensuing year.
15
 In other words, the 
gradual improvement of the Mexican economy in conjunction with the reduced economic 
prospect in the U.S., especially after the Great Recession in 2008, are likely responsible for the 
decline in the illegal immigration from Mexico, thereby lowering the overall number of 
undocumented immigrants coming to the U.S.
16
 
With respect to the impact on the national economy, border enforcement does not fare 
better. Many Americans oppose more open immigration policy believing that undocumented 
immigrants often ‘take away’ their jobs. In contrast, studies suggest that most undocumented 
immigrants fill the jobs the native-born Americans don’t want to do themselves due to the harsh 
nature of those jobs.
17
 Furthermore, one study at the Cato Institute has documented the negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
13
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Migration,” last modified September 11, 2017. 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration. As the exact number of undocumented immigrants 
coming into the United States every year cannot be known for obvious reasons, most experts rely on the number of 
apprehensions of undocumented immigrants at the border as the proxy, although such use is not without 
controversy. 
 
The illegal immigration, however, surged back this year. The level of apprehension number from March to May was 
triple the level for the same period in 2017. Kulish, “What It Costs.” 
 
14
 See, for example, Manuela Angelucci, “U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal 
Migration,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 60, no. 2 (Janurary 2012), 311-357. 
 
15
 Gordan H. Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo, “illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: 
Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S-Mexico Border,” The American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (December 
1999), 1337-1357. 
 
16
 Until 2014, the majority of the undocumented immigrants coming to the U.S. were of Mexican origin. The 
significant decrease in the number of Mexican undocumented immigrants, therefore, had translated into a major 
reduction in the overall undocumented immigrants coming to the U.S.  
 
17
 See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Wall,” Brookings, August 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-wall-the-
real-costs-of-a-barrier-between-the-united-states-and-mexico/, for example.  
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impact of border enforcement on the income of U.S. households and found that a policy that 
reduces the number of low-skilled immigrant workers by 28.6 percent, compared to projected 
levels, would reduce U.S. household income by about 0.5 percent, or $80 billion.
18
 Many studies 
have also found that the net impact of illegal immigration on the US economy is minimal making 
it hard to justify the massive spending on border security from an economic standpoint. 
Border enforcement has also cost local businesses millions of dollars without any 
compensation. For example, the construction of the border fence along the Rio Grande Valley, 
according to the local city and economic development groups in Brownsville, broke some 
business deals for the area, killing multi-million dollar residential and commercial developments 
that would have been substantial for the city’s economy.19 Others have complained that their 
farming and ranching activities have been “disrupted by the deployment of USBP resources to 
the border and commercial activities that suffer from reduced regional economic activity.”20  
If all this money poured into border enforcement did not necessarily help Americans keep 
their jobs or fare better economically, it surely must have made America a much safer and 
healthier place for them, from illegal drugs and foreign terrorists. Right? Unfortunately, we do 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, a recent report by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine on the economic impact 
of immigrants found that there is “little to no negative effects on overall wages and employment of native-born 
workers in the longer term.” National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal 
Consequences of Immigration, The National Academies Press, 2017, https://doi.org/10.17226/23550.  
 
18
 Peter B. Nixon and Maureen T. Rimmer, Restriction or Legalization? Measuring the Economic Benefits of 
Immigration Reform, Cato Institute, August 13, 2009, http://clca.org/immigration/moreinfoDocs/tpa-040.pdf. 
 
19
 Rafael Carranza, “Leaders Blame Lost Business Deals on Border Fence,” KGBT Channel 4 News, November 2, 
2009, http://borderwallinthenews.blogspot.com/2009/11/leaders-blame-lost-business-deals-on.html?m=0. 
 
20
 Carla N. Argueta, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, Congressional Research 
Service, April 19, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42138.pdf.  
 
On the other hand, the increased border enforcement may have had some positive economic impact on the local 
economy, e.g., more border-related jobs and more economic activity throughout, I could not find an empirical data 
on the topic. Whatever the benefits of the border enforcement on the local economy, however, I doubt it would 
outweigh its costs. 
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not yet have any empirical data to support that has been the case. First, the public fear of foreign 
terrorism seems to be overblown. According to the study by Alex Nowrasteh, from 1875 through 
2015, the average chance of dying in an foreign terrorist attack was 1 in 3,609,709 a year.
21
 In 
comparison, the chance of being killed in a car accident during a comparable period was 1 in 
10,347 a year.
22
 In short, an American is nearly 350 times more likely to die in a car accident, 
and five times more likely to be struck by a lightning in a given year, than to die in a terrorist 
attack by a foreign-born immigrant.
23
 “The United States government should continue to devote 
resources to screening immigrants and foreigners for terrorism or other threats,” Nowrasteh 
recommends, “but large policy changes like an immigration or tourist moratorium would impose 
far greater costs than benefits.”24 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether increased border enforcement has proved to be a 
greater barrier for drug cartels. According to the 2007 survey by the Department of Health and 
Human Services, almost 20 million Americans (8% of the population aged 12 or older) took 
illegal drugs in the month prior to the survey.
25
 In 2009, about 1.4 million pounds of marihuana 
                                                 
21
 Alex Nowrasteh, “Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis,” Cato Institute, September 13, 2016. 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/terrorism-immigration-risk-analysis.  
 
22
 Calculation is mine, based on the Wikipedia data on the number of vehicle fatalities in the U.S. from 1899 to 2013 
(a total of 3,613,732) and the U.S. Census Bureau’s data on the current U.S. population of 327,984,962. “Motor 
Vehicle Fatality Rate in U.S. by Year,” Wikipedia. Retrieved June 25, 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motor_vehicle_fatality_rate_in_U.S._by_year. “U.S. and World Population Clock,” 
The United States Census Bureau, accessed June 25, 2018, https://www.census.gov/popclock/. 
 
23
 “Flash Facts About Lightening,” National Geographic News, last modified June 24, 2005, accessed June 25, 2018, 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/06/0623_040623_lightningfacts.html. 
 
24
 Nowrasteh, “Terrorism and Immigration.” According to his more recent study, undocumented immigrants were 25 
percent, 11.5 percent, and 79 percent less likely to be convicted of homicide, sexual assault, and larceny, 
respectively, than native-born Americans. Alex Nowresteh, “Criminal Immigrants in Texas: Illegal Immigrant 
Conviction and Arrest Rates for Homicide, Secual Assault, Larceny, and Other Crimes,” Cato Institute, February 26, 
2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/criminal-immigrants-texas-illegal-
immigrant.     
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was seized in the Arizona border.
26
 It was one of the most successful apprehensions in recent 
years, and yet it is estimated to be only 20 percent of all the marijuana flowing into the U.S.  
Critics claim that despite its advertised goal of curtailing the drug inflow, most border 
enforcement programs are directed at apprehending people rather than substances such as 
drugs.
27
 Furthermore, critics argue that we should shift our spending from cracking down on 
illegal drug inflow to the prevention of overdoses of prescription drugs, such as opioids and 
depressants, which they claim are more responsible for deaths than the illegal drugs.
28
 It could 
also be argued that the genuine, and more effective, solution lies in addressing the demand for 
the illegal drugs by the native-born Americans than in trying to control its supply. The market 
economy dictates that as long as there is a considerable demand for something, there will also be 
a corresponding supply, regardless of the government control (according to a conservative 
argument against gun control).  
Until now we have surveyed the economic and security benefits and costs, both concrete 
and potential, of the U.S. border enforcement policy on both individual and national level. In the 
rest of this section, I will discuss the most direct impact of the U.S. border control on those who 
are controlled, the undocumented immigrants.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, “Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings,” 2007, 
http://www.dpft.org/resources/NSDUHresults2007.pdf. 
 
26
 Mark Potter, “Illegal Drugs Flow Over and Under U.S. Border,” NBC News, October 22, 2009, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33433955/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/illegal-drugs-flow-over-under-us-
border/#.WzF8edVKgdV. 
 
27
 See Joanna Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice:  A Review of Operations Streamline, University of California, 
Berkeley Law School, January 2010, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf, 
and Brendan Fischer “America’s Inefficient and Ineffective Approach to Border Security,” PR Watch, December 23, 
2010, https://www.prwatch.org/news/2010/12/9832/americas-inefficient-and-ineffective-approach-border-security. 
 
28
 Unity Behavioral Health, “Prescription Drugs Responsible for More Deaths than illicit Drugs,” 2017, 
https://www.unityrehab.com/blog/prescription-drugs-more-deaths-than-illicit-drugs/. 
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Human Costs  
The most significant impact of border enforcement is manifested in the injuries—
physical, mental, and economic—it brings on human beings. The increase in border enforcement 
has been criticized as having increased the number of migrant deaths. Since the introduction of 
“Operation Gatekeeper” in San Diego in 1994, one of the first steps toward militarizing the 
border, there was a 600% increase in the official death count during the first four years.
29
 DHS 
data suggests that the number of known migrant deaths was on average 369 per year in 2010-
2011, a sharp increase from 250 in 1999. In FY 2012 the number of migrant deaths reached 
463.
30
 Considering the steady decline in illegal immigration in recent years, the increase in 
migrant deaths en route to the U.S. suggests that enhanced border enforcement has made border 
crossing a much more hazardous undertaking. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 United States Government Accountability Office, Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border 
Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated, August 2006. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf. 
 
30
 Argueta, Border Security.  
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Figure 4. Known Migrants Deaths, Southwest Border, 1998-2017. Reprinted from Bob 
Ortega, “Border Patrol failed to count hundreds of migrants deaths on US soil – 
CNN.com,” CNN , May 15, 2018, https://penandthepad.com/cite-article-cnn-8457271.html. 
For the source of the graph the article just cites, “US Border Patrol; local authorities and 
news reports.” 
 
 
If the intent of the government was to discourage illegal immigration by rendering border 
crossing more difficult and dangerous, it might have pushed the immigrants to take more risk 
instead than give up. The only winner therefore seems to be the smugglers. Under border 
militarization, undocumented migrants are now ever more pressured to hire and rely on 
smugglers,
31
 who are often associated with drug cartels, exposing themselves to extortion, rape, 
kidnapping, and other abuses.
32
 Facing rampant violence and abject poverty at home on the one 
                                                 
31
 According to a Border Patrol survey of apprehended migrants, the number of undocumented immigrants who used 
smugglers rose to 80 to 90 percent in recent years from less than half in the early 1970s. Kulish, “What It Costs.”  
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hand, as we will see in more detail in the next section, and the increased risk of the migration 
journey on the other, migrants are often left with no choice but trust their fate in the hands of the 
criminals on their journey through Mexico.
33
 
Border enforcement has also led to dehumanization of undocumented migrants. The 
increase of military technology and tactics have shifted the image of undocumented immigrants 
in the mind of the public, from human beings fleeing poverty, hunger, and lack of opportunities 
into criminals or the ‘enemy other’ whose basic rights no longer need to be protected. Today’s 
political rhetoric has also contributed and intensified dehumanization by conflating 
undocumented immigrants with foreign terrorists and criminals. Most recently, President Trump 
has compared undocumented immigrants with MS-13, a criminal organization in Central 
America, characterizing them as vermin that will “pour into and infest our country.”34 
It is not surprising that dehumanization of undocumented immigrants in rhetoric, coupled 
with the militarization of borders, would materialize into more concrete forms of human rights 
violations. According to a study by No More Deaths, apprehended migrants are often deprived of 
access to necessities such as food, water, and medical care.
35
 From 2004 to 2010, another study 
shows, over 160,000 undocumented immigrants were deported without having an opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                             
32
 Michalowski, “Border Militarization,” 67-69.  
 
The Trump Administration’s “zero tolerance” policy has exacerbated the matter. Rather than curbing illegal 
immigration, says Guadalupe Correa-Caberera, a professor at George Mason University, the zero tolerance policy 
will “increase the demand for smugglers and will further strengthen the connection between human smugglers and 
other criminal actors, such as drug cartels and corrupt local law enforcement.” Kulish, “What It Costs.” 
 
33
 In Mexico, on average of 70,000 people become victims of human trafficking every year. Jeremy Kryt, “The 
Border Crackdown is Forcing Migrants to Become Mexican Cartel Slaves,” The Daily Beast, Aug 6, 2017. 
 
34
 Jack Holmes, “This Was Another Sign of How Deep the Poison of Trumpism Has Sunk In,” Esquire, Jun 21, 
2018, https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a21748302/trump-rally-minnesota-immigrants-violent-criminals/.  
 
35
 A Culture of Cruelty: Abuse and Impunity in Short-Term U.S. Border Patrol Custody, Tucson: No More Deaths, 
2011, http://forms.nomoredeaths.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CultureOfCruelty-full.compressed.pdf. 
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defend themselves in court.
36
 Trump’s most recent call to deprive the undocumented immigrants’ 
right to a trial only reflects the public ignorance of the rampant violations of their right to a due 
process already taking place.
37
    
Despite the numerous reports that have been made public by humanitarian organizations, 
the human costs perpetrated by Border Patrol agents continue to persist due to the internal 
structural problems within the organizations responsible for the oversight. The Homeland 
Security Advisory Council wrote in a 2016 report that “there is no one who the Secretary of 
Homeland Security can clearly hold accountable for seeing to it that corruption does not take 
root within CBP” and the agency had a “broken disciplinary process.”38 A former head of 
Internal Affairs at CBP had also repeatedly warned about corruption at the agency.
39
 
Furthermore, ICE did not follow its own prosecutorial discretion guidelines 51% of the time,
40
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 Jennifer Lee Koh, Jayashri Srikantiah, and Karen C. Tumlin, Deportation Without Due Process, Los Angeles: 
National Immigration Law Center, September 2011, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Deportation-
Without-Due-Process-2011-09.pdf. 
 
37
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Due Process Rights,” New York Times, June 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-
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le)0.pdf. 
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“Homeland Insecurity,” The Observer, https://www.texasobserver.org/homeland-security-corruption-border-patrol/; 
Vicki B. Gaubeca, “Newly confirmed CBP Chief Must Tackle Agency’s Culture of Violence, Corruption,” The Hill, 
March 26, 2018, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/380376-newly-confirmed-cbp-chief-
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Deep Reform,” NPR, October 29, 2016. https://www.npr.org/2016/10/29/499739689/combating-corruption-u-s-
customs-and-border-protection-seeks-deep-reform.  
 
40
 According to ICE, there have been 1310 claims of sexual abuse against detainees between 2013 and 2017. Human 
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while the DHS Office of Inspector General, an office tasked with Border Patrol oversight, has 
repeatedly delegated the responsibility to investigate to the local Border Patrol stations from 
which the very abuse complaints originated.
41 
In sum, the cost-benefit analysis of the U.S. border policy that focuses on border closure 
the last few decades seems to demonstrate its ineffectiveness against the massive spending that 
goes into it. Despite the billions of taxpayers’ money gone to border enforcement, the return on 
investment, when looked at empirically, has been more than disappointing. The superficial goal 
of border enforcement—cutting down the illegal immigration and drug inflow and fighting 
terrorism—has been amorphous if not impossible to achieve, whereas its costs, both to 
Americans and migrants, have been all too tangible and often outrageous. Can there be a more 
cost-effective and humane alternative to border enforcement as a way to address illegal 
immigration?  
 
2.2   Alternative to Border Enforcement: Addressing Push Factors 
 
The economic and human costs described above indicate that the current policy that puts 
emphasis on enforcement of immigration laws above everything else is fundamentally flawed. It 
addresses only the last and the most visible part of a long chain of events, and thus can only have 
short-term results. Most crucially it neglects the very root causes of illegal immigration, which if 
                                                 
41
 Transactional Records Action Clearinghouse, “Reforms of ICE Detainer Program Largely Ignored by Field 
Officers,” last modified August 9, 2016, accessed July 2, 2018, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/432/.  
 
To address the lack of accountability in border agencies, in 2016 Congressmen Pearce (R-NM-02) and O’Rourke 
(D-TX-16) introduced the “Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and Community Engagement Act” (H.R. 
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increase training and resources for CBP personnel, provide reporting and oversight for border enforcement by 
requiring the HDS to report on management practices, and instruct the Government Accountability Office to report 
on the CBP and DHS’s use force policy. 
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left unaddressed will continue to fuel illegal immigration in our southern border, regardless of 
the resources and manpower we devote into its enforcement. Thus any border policy that will 
result in long-term outcome in reducing illegal immigration with minimal economic and human 
costs must involve strategies regarding push factors. What then are these ‘push factors’ of illegal 
immigration, and what may be the best way to address them?  
Undocumented immigration in the United States had long been dominated by Mexican 
immigrants. However, the number of Mexican immigrants has steadily declined in the last few 
decades. In the meantime, the number of undocumented immigrants from Central America, 
especially from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala (together known as the Northern 
Triangle) has surged in the last few years, surpassing their Mexican counterparts in 2014.
42
 
Furthermore, a significant portion of the new immigrant cohort attempting a dangerous 
northbound trip were unaccompanied child migrants from these Northern Triangle countries. The 
apprehension of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) doubled three years in a row, between 
2012 and 2014 (see Figure 5).
43
 In total, 179,000 unaccompanied children from the Northern 
Triangle were apprehended while entering the United States between 2011 and 2016 and made 
up about 75 percent of all UACs who were apprehended at the southern border in 2014.
44
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Figure 5. Family and Unaccompanied Minor Apprehensions as Share of Total 
Apprehensions, FY 2012-18. Reprinted from Customs and Border Protection, "United 
States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children 
Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016," updated October 18, 
2016, www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016; 
Customs and Border Protection, "Southwest Border Migration FY2017;" Customs and 
Border Protection, "Southwest Border Migration FY2018." 
 
 
Food Insecurity & Poverty 
One major push factor of illegal immigration from the Northern Triangle countries is 
food insecurity caused by poverty and lack of economic opportunity. The Northern Triangle 
countries are among the poorest countries in the world. According to the World Bank, over 60 
percent of those living in rural areas in the Northern Triangle are living in poverty.
45
 As a result, 
in Guatemala about half of the entire population suffers from chronic under-nutrition.
46
 The 
World Food Program (WFP) released a report that presents evidence of the specific link between 
                                                 
45
 The World Bank, “Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural population),” accessed 
October 23, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.RUHC?view=chart. 
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 World Food Program, et al., Hunger Without Borders: The Hidden links between Food Insecurity, Violence and 
Migration in the Northern Triangle of Central America, 2014, 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/liaison_offices/wfp277544.pdf. 
 21 
 
 
 
emigration from the Northern Triangle countries and the inability of families to put food on the 
table. WFP found that more than half of the households interviewed for its report spend more 
than two-thirds of their monthly income on food. And the top reason listed for emigration was 
“no food.”47  Overall, food insecurity was a more important factor for emigration than violence 
in Guatemala and Honduras.
48
 Another study also found that the lack of employment and 
education opportunity has been a key driver of the youth migration in the Northern Triangle, 
where more than one million people are neither in school nor employed.
49
 
Understanding the importance of economic stability in the Northern Triangle, United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been working with the local 
governments and farmers in agricultural programming and trade and business development. As a 
result, the effort led to a 51 percent increase in rural farmers’ sales in the Western Highlands and 
20,000 additional jobs in the agricultural sector in Guatemala, as well as lifting 21,817 Honduran 
families out of poverty.
50
 The assistance to 11,000 small and medium enterprises has also 
generated over $153 million in sales and exports, as well as creating 22,000 new jobs in El 
Salvador over the last five years.
51
 The FY 2017 amount of the aid packet for Central America, 
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most of which goes into the Northern Triangle countries, stands at $655 million, amounting to 
17% of the Border Patrol budget and 5% of the CBP budget.
52
  
 
Violence 
Another major push factor of unauthorized immigration from the Northern Triangle is the 
increase in violence in those countries. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are among the 
most dangerous countries in the world, where a total of 17,422 people were killed in 2015 
alone.
53
 In El Salvador one is 24 times more likely to be murdered than one would be in the 
U.S.
54
 A combination of gang activity, widespread firearms, and weak criminal justice systems 
have been driving violence in these countries. Consequently, people of the Northern Triangle are 
fleeing the extreme violence in their home countries seeking refuge in neighboring countries, 
many of them heading to the United States.
55
  
In a recent study, Michael Clemens found that “every 10 additional homicides across the 
years 2011-2016 caused six additional children to be apprehended as UACs” in the average 
municipality of the Northern Triangle.
56
 In light of this causal relationship, Clemens argues that 
the current prioritization of border security over violence prevention in the Northern Triangle (in 
FY14, for example, the U.S. spent 10 times on managing UAC arrivals as on violence prevention 
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in the Northern Triangle) makes no economic sense.
57
 As each UAC apprehension required a 
U.S. federal expenditure of about $50,000, it would be more cost-effective to focus on 
preventing one homicide per year with $200,000 or less than on child apprehension.
58
  
In other words, it is in our economic interest to divert part of the border enforcement 
budget into violence prevention effort, such as the Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI), which in a joint effort with USAID, has reduced 61 percent in homicides in several El 
Salvadoran municipalities between 2015 and 2016, and 62 percent in homicides in the most 
violent Honduran neighborhood between 2013 and 2015.
59
 
 
2.3   Conclusion 
 
Has the decades-long border policy that prioritized border enforcement resulted in a 
positive net outcome for the United States? Based on the current research, the answer is a 
resounding ‘No’. The enormous spending on border enforcement over the last decade in the U.S. 
has had, at best, minimal and dubious benefits and, at worst, treacherous economic and human 
costs. The border policy that emphasizes securing the southwestern border has had detrimental 
effects on both immigrants and border communities. Instead of focusing on border closure, we 
should look to an alternative approach that makes more fiscal and moral sense: one that 
addresses push-factors as the key component in reducing illegal immigration. While early in its 
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assessment, the data already shows the effectiveness of such current programs in addressing the 
push factors in the Northern Triangle.  
Throughout this chapter, I have focused on the U.S. policy of border enforcement and 
taken for granted that the U.S. has a right to enforce its borders in the first place. In the next 
chapter, however, I will question this very assumption that the state is morally entitled to control 
its borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
THE STATE’S RIGHT TO CONTROL IMMIGRATION 
 
Border control, as we saw in the foregoing chapter, has been the hallmark of the U.S. 
immigration policy for at least the last several decades, endorsed by the politicians from left and 
right. As Reagan’s earlier remark, “A nation that cannot control its borders is not a nation,” 
exemplifies, ‘take back the control of our borders’ makes a strong intuitive sense as well as a 
memorable political slogan. In part due to our revolutionary history and culture of individualism, 
Americans, it appears to me, are particularly vulnerable to the fear of losing any degree of 
independence of any kind, and this fear often turns into an obsession to having full control.
60
 
Consequently, it is all too natural that we can’t stand not being in full control of even our own 
borders—especially in the age of globalization, in which the control of any sort, from economy 
to terrorism, seems to slip through our fingers.  
 
With this cultural and historical backdrop, it is unthinkable to question our deepest 
conviction in our right to control our borders. The difficulty only multiplies by our liberal belief 
that we can do whatever we want with what is ours.
61
 Nonetheless, I want to bring this deeply 
                                                 
60
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held, almost personal, assumption onto the table for a philosophical biopsy. In this chapter, I will 
explore two of the most prominent arguments on this issue: Michael Walzer’s argument that the 
state indeed has a right to enforce its borders and Joseph Carens’ argument that the state does not 
have such right and that borders should be generally open. At the end of the discussion, I will 
present my own reasons why I believe Carens is right as well as my critique of his argument.   
 
3.1  Walzer and the Communities of Character 
  In the chapter on political membership in Spheres of Justice (1983), Michael Walzer 
argues for the state’s right to control immigration in three steps: first, by describing the current 
practice and understanding of political membership in our society using rough comparisons of 
private clubs and family;
 
second, by appealing to commonly accepted values in liberal 
democracy such as open neighborhoods; and last, by arguing on the basis of the state’s right to 
self-determination. In this section I will focus exclusively on Walzer’s argument for the state’s 
right to control admissions before we turn to the arguments for open borders in the next.
62
  
                                                                                                                                                             
before the humans even existed, and thus it is, in essence, a property of no one. Another cure would be, as I will 
argue in the next chapter, a healthy dose of cosmopolitan conception of humanity—that all human beings form a 
single cosmopolitan community that is nobler and of higher value than national and local ones.  
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Our Notion of Political Membership (the club and family analogy) 
  Wazler begins his argument by comparing our understanding of political membership to 
that of the memberships to smaller communities—clubs and families—to help understand the 
complicated and vague concept of political membership as understood and practiced in our 
society today. First, both the immigration policies of today’s nation-states and admissions criteria 
of private clubs assume that nonmembers have no inherent right to the membership but have to 
go through certain application process and meet particular requirements of membership. Both 
states and clubs are generally considered free to decide their own admissions process and 
membership requirements.  
  Nation-states, Walzer argues, also resemble families, in that both states and families often 
practice a kind of nepotism by giving priority to their own kindred. Walzer notes that “citizens 
often believe themselves morally bound to open the doors of their country . . . to a particular 
group of outsiders, recognized as national or ethnic ‘relatives’.”63 For example, most people 
would say there’s nothing wrong in rescuing one’s own child over the stranger’s when both are 
drowning and only one child can be saved. In fact, it can be argued that one has special 
responsibilities for the welfare of one’s own family members, especially one’s own children and 
parents. In a similar way, nation-states also engage in various acts of favoritism. For example, 
states generally give priority in immigration to their citizens’ immediate family members. A 
more specific example of such family-based discrimination would be the Israel’s massive airlift 
that rescued nearly twenty-one thousand Ethiopian Jews from the famine and civil war in 
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Ethiopia in the early 1980s.
64
 In this sense, nation-states may feel some special responsibility to 
prioritize their own people over others in their immigration policy.  
 
Appeal to Common Values (distinct cultures, democracy, and open neighborhood)  
  Second, Walzer advocates his argument for the state’s right to exclude by appealing to 
the commonly accepted values in Western democracy: distinctive cultures, democratic politics, 
and open neighborhoods, all of which, he argues, can exist only under closed borders. Claiming 
the “distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure,”65 Walzer argues that “if such 
distinctiveness is a value” that needs to be protected, then “closure must be permitted 
somewhere.”66 However, Walzer does not give any argument for his premise that distinctiveness 
of cultures is an important value in itself other than that is how “most people … seem to 
believe.”67    
  Similar to distinctive cultures, Walzer argues that democratic politics depend on “the 
kind of boundedness that states provide.”68 One of the Walzer’s central claims throughout his 
argument is that Western democracy cannot exist without the cohesion and the shared sense of 
identity of a community, which in turn requires some level of state closure. “[C]ommunities must 
have boundaries,” he writes, “and however these are determined with regard to territory and 
resources, they depend with regard to population on a sense of mutual relatedness and 
mutuality.
69
 Without these boundaries, Walzer asserts, there can be no “communities of 
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character,” which he defines as “historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women 
with some special commitment to one another.”70    
  Likewise, Walzer claims open neighborhoods and open borders are incompatible to each 
other. “Neighborhoods,” he writes, “can be open only if countries are at least potentially 
closed.”71  
Only if the state makes a selection among would-be members and guarantees the loyalty, security, 
and welfare of the individuals it selects, can local communities take shape as “indifferent” 
associations, determined solely by personal preference and market capacity.
72
 
Walzer believes that membership to neighborhoods should be generally open to everyone within 
the state. He warns that if the state opens its borders, however, the neighborhoods will close 
themselves off and become “little states … [organizing] to defend the local politics and culture 
against strangers.”73 
 
The Right to Self-Determination  
  At the center of Walzer’s argument for the state’s right to control immigration is the 
thesis that a community cannot exist without some boundary that draws a line, both physical and 
figurative, distinguishing its members from non-members. For Walzer, it is difficult to 
exaggerate the importance of such distinction, since he believes the whole theory of distributive 
justice in a community begins with “an account of membership rights” that distinguish members 
from nonmembers.
74
 Not only are political states and clubs generally considered free to form 
their own admissions criteria but they should, for “at stake here is the shape of the community.”75 
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Communities should be entitled to shape their communities however they want, Walzer argues, 
because the right to self-determination is one of the fundamental rights of both individuals and 
collective groups. It is this right to self-determination Walzer believes to be the primary source 
of the right to restrict admissions. In an often-cited passage he writes:  
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest 
meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character.
76
  
This feature of the “character” of communities—the common culture, language, and history—
gives political communities “a right to protect their members’ shared sense of what they are 
about” through immigration control.77 
 
Possible Constraints  
Nonetheless, Walzer concedes that states are not absolute in setting their immigration 
policy but are subject to both internal and external constraints. Internally, Walzer claims states 
are constrained in two ways: first, the immigration policy must be decided by “all the members 
(including those who hold membership simply by right of place).”78 Second, the immigration 
policy must reflect “the shared understandings of those who are already members.”79 This way 
an immigration policy, Walzer argues, can be “judged morally and politically as well as 
factually.”80   
In addition to the internal constraints, Walzer believes states may also be subject to 
external constraints such as the principle of mutual aid. According to the principle, one ought to 
help strangers “if (1) [the assistance] is needed or urgently needed by one of the parties; and (2) 
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if the risks and costs of giving it are relatively low for the other party.”81 Walzer believes that the 
principle can be applied to both individuals and collective groups such as political states: 
“Groups of people ought to help necessitous strangers whom they somehow discover in their 
midst or on their path.”82 For example, a political state may have a moral obligation to accept 
small number of political refugees, regardless of their immigration policy.  
Nonetheless, Walzer argues the mutual aid principle is limited by the state’s right to self-
determination at the same time. “The force of the principle is uncertain,” he writes, “in part 
because of its own vagueness, in part because it sometimes comes up against the internal force of 
social meanings. And these meanings can be specified and are specified, through the decision-
making processes of the political community.”83 Therefore, Walzer argues, there might be limits 
to the number of refugees a state is morally required to take in, though he “[doesn’t] know how 
to specify them.”84 Refugees may appeal to humanity and the principle of mutual aid for their 
asylum claim, and one “wishes them success,” Walzer writes, but “in particular cases, with 
reference to a particular state, they may well have no right to be successful.”85 He sums up this 
complex relationship between the moral constraint and the right to self-determination this way:  
[T]o take in large numbers of refugees is often morally necessary; but the right to restrain the 
flow remains a fact of communal self-determination. The principle of mutual aid can only modify 
and not transform admissions policies rooted in a particular community’s understanding of 
itself.
86
 
 In sum, Walzer’s argument for the state’s right to control immigration begins by 
exploring our understanding and practice of political membership, which assumes some state 
                                                 
81
 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 33. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid., 34. 
84
 Ibid., 51. 
85
 Ibid., 50. 
86
 Ibid., 51. 
 32 
 
 
 
closure, then proceeds to the needs for protecting important values that we hold by closing 
borders, and ends with an argument based on the state’s right to communal self-determination. 
Walzer’s argument has proved to be one of the most influential and cogent arguments that have 
ever been made in support of the state’s right to border closure. Nevertheless, Walzer’s argument 
fails to address some of the important questions.  
First, while the term ‘membership’ is the major concept playing central role in his 
argument, it is nevertheless far from clear what Walzer means by it. The term ‘membership’ can 
denote two different meanings: it could mean a legal right to enter the political state and enjoy 
basic civil rights protected by that state (such as the rights a tourist would have), which I call 
“residential membership”. It could also mean a fuller notion of membership, such as permanent 
residency or citizenship, which I will refer to as “political membership.” Between these two 
meanings—a right to enter a state on the one hand and a right to participate in political 
governance on the other—a significant and obvious distinction exists in terms of the rights each 
bestows on their bearers.  
However, Walzer uses the term ‘membership’ almost interchangeably without 
acknowledging this important distinction. At times, he seems to argue the state has a right to 
block immigrants from entering its territory on the ground it concerns the membership issue. At 
others, membership is used only to refer to political membership. This ambiguity in the use of his 
central term can be a source of much confusion and unproductive debate, for most open borders 
supporters are not advocating the abolition of borders per se but only border control, as Joseph 
Carens writes, “having borders that are open is not the same as having no borders.”87 In other 
words, when Carens makes a case for open borders, as we will see in more detail below, he is 
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arguing that everyone has a right to the residential membership in a society of one’s choice, a 
right to live wherever one chooses to, not that everyone has a right to the political membership in 
any democratic state.    
 Second, Walzer seems to appeal to either moral intuitionism or consequentialist 
arguments when he argues on the ground of preserving commonly held values such as open 
neighborhoods and distinctive cultures. The implicit logic seems to be as follows: if we value A, 
and A requires B, then B is morally acceptable. If we as society value open neighborhoods, and 
these require closed borders, then border closure is morally acceptable. However, such argument 
can be criticized as an argumentum ad populum, a fallacious argument that concludes a 
proposition must be true because many or most people believe so, as Walzer’s argument seems 
to imply that whatever that would strengthen or give rise to those that most of us value must be 
morally acceptable. Moreover, his argument is subject to a moral objection that we have no 
guarantee that what we as society hold dear is not somehow morally problematic or it can only 
be secured at too high a cost to other values or people.   
Last, it is not clear whether Walzer’s application of the principle of mutual aid at the state 
level does not commit a categorical error. The original mutual aid principle applies to a 
relationship between individuals. If we want to extend the scope of the principle and apply it to 
collective groups, as Walzer does, then it can be argued that the principle should be applied to a 
relationship between two political states, not between a political state and individuals. In other 
words, properly applied at the state level, a state may be obliged to assist another state in 
desperate need when it can do so without a major cost to itself.  
However, I doubt Walzer would be willing to attribute such broad a moral obligation to 
political states, since doing so vastly increases their moral responsibility. For example, the 
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United States can spend substantially more money in foreign aid to El Salvador without any 
significant cost to itself, but many will disagree to conclude that therefore the U.S. is morally 
required to do so. Although this objection may not seem that important or relevant for his overall 
argument for the state’s right to border closure, his argument, in fact, depends on his mutual aid 
principle, without which his overall thesis can be vulnerable to inconsistency between his belief 
in the state’s right to control its borders and his embrace of the intuitive moral sense of 
obligation to accept desperate refugees fleeing violence and persecution at their home states.  
In addition to these objections, many liberal philosophers and political theorists who 
support more lenient immigration policy have made counterarguments and rebuttals to Walzer.
88
 
None, however, has proved more influential and eloquent than Joseph Carens’ defense of open 
borders. 
 
3.2 Carens and the Freedom of Movement  
 In 1987 philosopher Joseph Carens, it could be said, single-handedly started the open 
borders debate with his seminal article titled, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” 
In the article Carens argues that three of the most influential philosophies—Robert Nozick’s 
libertarianism, John Rawls’ liberalism, and utilitarianism—when applied to the issue of 
immigration, all lead to the conclusion for open borders and freedom of movement across 
political states. His radical claim on immigration and human rights took direct aim at the 
conventional understanding of the modern state-system. The article was an immense success in 
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bringing the issue of immigration, a hitherto neglected topic in philosophy, to the attention of 
moral philosophers and political theorists. In The Ethics of Immigration (2014), his first book-
length argument for open borders, Carens discusses an array of immigration issues regarding 
some of the most contentious topics today, from birthright citizenship and naturalization to 
refugees and undocumented immigrants. In this section I will explore Carens’ expansive 
argument for open-borders expounded in The Ethics of Immigration.
89
  
In the chapter titled “The Case for Open Borders,” Carens directly challenges the very 
notion of the right of a state to control immigration that has been taken for granted in the modern 
period. By looking at “the implications of democratic principles for immigration when we treat 
the idea that states are entitled to control admissions as an open question rather than a 
presupposition,” he argues that “in principle, borders should generally be open and people should 
normally be free to leave their country of origin and settle in another.”90 Through a set of 
arguments based on the democratic principles, Carens attempts to show that “the idea of open 
borders fits better with our most basic values—liberty and equality—and with our most deeply 
rooted intuitions about justice” than the idea of states’ right to control their borders.91  
 
Three Assumptions 
 Carens’ open borders argument has two major components: equality and freedom, which 
he believes to be the two most important democratic values and to which he appeals throughout 
his argument. Carens tells the readers upfront that his argument presupposes three basic 
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assumptions, which he believes also “undergird the claim to moral legitimacy of every 
contemporary democratic regime.”92 The first assumption is that there is no natural social 
order.
93
 Government with the power to control its borders, as we currently have, is not a natural 
arrangement for humans but our own invention. “The institutions and practices that govern 
human beings,” Carens writes, “are ones that human beings have created and can change.”94  
The second is the egalitarian principle that all human beings are of equal moral worth. No 
one deserves more than another simply by virtue of the random chance that determines one’s 
place of birth in the world. Someone born in the poorest country deserves as much protection of 
his human dignity and basic rights and worth as much as another born in the richest country. 
Lastly, Carens assumes that any restriction on human freedom must provide a moral justification. 
Human freedom is one of the most cherished and important values such that any restriction on it 
must have a good reason to do so; otherwise, it would be a human rights violation.
95
  
 
Egalitarian Argument 
As mentioned earlier, Carens’ argument for open borders can be divided into two main 
components, and the first concerns the issue of equality. Carens argues that the immigration 
control by states is unjust because it perpetuates the vast and unfair inequality found across 
different countries, which is based on random chance like one’s place of birth. He compares the 
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opportunities someone born in a rich country would have to the feudal privileges in the Middle 
Ages—“an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances.”96 
To be born a citizen of a rich state in Europe or North America is like being born into the nobility 
(even though many of us belong to the lesser nobility). To be born a citizen of a poor country in 
Asia or Africa is like being born into the peasantry in the Middle Ages (even if there are a few 
rich peasants and some peasants manage to gain entry to the nobility).
97
  
Today’s state-system that allows sovereign states to control their borders and exclude foreigners 
at their will, Carens argues, is a moral equivalent to feudal system, as the current arrangements 
“not only grant great advantages on the basis of birth but also entrench these advantages by 
legally restricting mobility, making it extremely difficult for those born into a socially 
disadvantaged position to overcome that disadvantage, no matter how talented they are or how 
hard they work.”98 Like the medieval system, immigration control of modern states, Carens 
claims, “tie[s] people to the land of their birth almost as effectively” and so serves “a crucial 
mechanism for protecting a birthright privilege” in rich countries99 If feudalism came to be 
deemed unfair and cruel to the unfortunate, Carens challenges, why should the modern 
counterpart be any different? 
Carens also argues that open borders would contribute to a reduction in global inequality 
and enhance the equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity is one of the defining principles 
of our democratic society that rejected aristocracy in favor of meritocracy. One should be valued 
based on one’s merits, not lineage, and the equality of opportunity, though remaining an ideal, is 
the undergirding principle in our society that we believe in and strive to achieve. However, 
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without being able to move to where opportunities lie, Carens argues, one cannot take advantage 
of the principle of equality of opportunity, thus rendering the freedom of movement “an essential 
prerequisite for equality of opportunity.”100 Therefore, open borders would remain an important 
moral goal even if open borders did nothing to reduce global inequality. 
 
Freedom of Movement  
The second component of Carens’ argument appeals to human freedom, and in particular 
freedom of movement. He argues that states’ border control infringes a basic human right to 
freedom of movement. Carens concedes that unlike the well-established right to freedom of 
movement within states,
101
 the right to freedom of movement across states is a much contested 
notion that has yet to make into a major international human rights document. Thus he sets out to 
make “the case for seeing the freedom to move and reside wherever one wants as a vital human 
interest” that deserves protection as a human right.102  
First, Carens argues that freedom of movement across borders should be considered a 
basic human right because it is “a logical extension” of a well-established human right, the 
freedom of movement within states. Every reason that made the right to internal movement a 
basic right, Carens claims, can also be said of the right to international movement.
103
  
The radical disjuncture that treats freedom of movement within the state as a human right while 
granting states discretionary control over freedom of movement across state borders makes no 
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moral sense . . . . [T]he reasons why people want to move from one place to another will apply in 
both cases.
104
 
Furthermore, Carens argues that freedom of movement is also a “prerequisite to many 
other freedoms.”105 People need to be able to move freely, first and foremost, in order to live 
their lives as they choose. Whether it’s getting a job, living in an area, or marry an individual of 
one’s choice, one needs the freedom of movement, and it would be a serious infringement of 
one’s freedom, Carens asserts, if one had to ask for state permission for relocation every time 
one makes such personal decisions. Thus, freedom of movement not only enhances equality of 
opportunities but “contributes to individual autonomy both directly and indirectly” by making 
other freedoms possible.
106
 
Therefore, Carens argues, any infringement on the freedom of movement, including that 
of international movement, must provide a moral justification, and the justification must account 
for everyone whose freedom of movement is affected. Thus it is not enough to defend border 
control in the name of the rights of those within the borders alone, e.g., by arguing it is their 
rightful exercise of their right to self-determination. Rather, the justification must also account 
for those outside the borders for it is they too whose rights are directly affected by the border 
control. It must provide argument, Carens claims, “as to why the restriction on freedom is in the 
interest of, and fair to, all those who are subject to it.”107  
In sum, Carens argues for open borders in two ways: First, he argues that the morality of 
immigration control is tantamount to that of feudal system since both perpetuate unfair 
inequality. Thus open borders is both an important moral goal and a way to reduce global 
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inequality by allowing many of those in poor countries to have an array of opportunities that 
would have been denied otherwise. Second, Carens argues that border control, both in principle 
and practice, infringes individual freedom of movement across states, which he argues should be 
considered a basic human right because it is both a logical extension of a well-established human 
right and allows all the other freedoms to be realized.  
 
3.3  Conclusion 
However, Carens’ second argument that appeals to an individual right to freedom of 
movement is vulnerable to a challenge from an argument for competing individual rights. Take, 
for instance, property rights. While the right to move wherever one wants is appealing, it is not 
clear, however, whether it also entails the right to take advantage of the goods of someone else. 
Let me explain in more detail. 
What are the things that generally attract immigrants to immigrate into rich countries in 
the first place? Is it a job opportunity in these countries? A desire to be reunited with a beloved? 
Whatever it might be, one might argue that it is not the desirable object itself—whether a job or 
person—that the immigrants are seeking, but the entire environment that makes these goods 
possible in the first place. What is at stake in immigration, in other words, is not the mere 
physical space or some tangible goods in rich countries. It is precisely the system, both political 
and social, that allows and protects individual rights and gives basic opportunities for decent life. 
One moves from a politically oppressive state, like a dictatorship, to a free state such as a 
democratic republic that protects human rights. One moves from a state-controlled economy to a 
moderately-controlled free market that allows more job opportunities.  
On the other hand, the political, social systems in rich countries were created or at least 
started by those who were in these countries in the past and have been maintained and constantly 
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reformed by their current citizens.
108
 Then it can be argued that these political, social, economic 
systems in rich countries are in fact the property of those people in these countries who created 
them in the past.
109
 It could also be argued that the property ‘ownership’ of these systems can be 
inherited to the descendants, both biological and cultural, in these countries. If so, these political 
and social systems could then be considered as property of the current citizens in rich countries, 
who may not have invented the current systems and yet have maintained and constantly reformed 
them by passing new laws. If we grant the above, then there may be a stronger case for the 
state’s right to control immigration as an exercise of one’s shared property ownership.110  
In sum, it is not clear how Carens would address this challenge from the perspective of 
the ownership of the political and social system in rich countries. Even if individuals are entitled 
to move wherever they want, Carens would still need to address the issue of whether individuals 
have a right to participate in or reap the benefits from those systems created, developed, and 
maintained by others. Perhaps he won’t be able to address challenges like this, for his thesis is 
largely grounded on traditional liberalism, which emphasizes one’s individual rights and liberty. 
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Inevitably, disputes are bound to occur whenever two or more competing individual rights—e.g., 
my right to security vs. your right to privacy—come into conflict. Here we seem to have a 
conflict between a right to freedom of movement and a right to private property. 
 However, Carens’ egalitarian argument, which appeals to the inherent equality of human 
beings, rather than individual rights, seems to evade the competing rights challenge. Nonetheless, 
it is still in large part embedded within the traditional liberal view of sovereign nation-state. In 
other words, Carens does not dispute, at least explicitly, the nation-state system itself, but only 
one of its aspects, namely, its practice of border control. I would like to take one further step and 
challenge this very undergirding nation-state system, which I will argue may be the obstacle for 
open borders. In the next chapter, I will discuss the relationship between open borders and the 
nation-state and argue for a more expansive political and moral framework: cosmopolitanism.  
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CHAPTER IV 
NATION-STATES AND THE COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITY 
 
 “Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto”.111 
- Terence 
 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed and evaluated both sides of the open borders 
debate: Walzer’s argument for the state’s right to border closure and Caren’s case for an 
individual right to international movement. While both arguments are powerful, I find Carens’ 
case for open borders more convincing than Walzer’s argument, and I explained some of the 
reasons. At the same time, we saw that Carens’ individual rights approach is open to the 
competing individual rights challenge. On the other hand, his egalitarian argument based on the 
universal human equality may be immune to this challenge. Even then, however, I believe 
Caren’s egalitarian argument, and his open borders thesis as a whole, is at odds with the 
undergirding nation-state system, and thus should be framed within a more inclusive and 
expansive framework.  
  In this chapter, I will advance a cosmopolitan case for open borders, beginning with 
Carens’ analogy of feudalism, which helps us understand the key challenge of the current nation-
state system on the road to open borders. I will argue that cosmopolitanism will point the way 
forward, namely toward a conception of community, and possibly even of governance, that 
moves past that of the current nation-state to that of a cosmopolitan community. My presentation 
of cosmopolitanism is based on the tradition that began with the ancient Stoics and continued 
through Kant and Habermas.  
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4.1  The Nation-State 
I believe Carens is onto something when he compares today’s nation-state system to the 
feudalism in the Middle Ages. Under both systems, as he argues, life chances are largely 
determined by where and to whom one is born. However, the analogy cuts even deeper. Like the 
medieval caste system, I argue, the modern state system—especially its practice of border 
closure—is rooted in a rather ancient, and often unconscious, belief that those from other 
communities are fundamentally different than us.   
 
The Rise of Nation-States  
In the early history of Western civilization, the concept of community was largely limited 
to those of family members and relatives on the one end and small tribal states on the other.
112
 
The emergence of the city-state as a form of governance and community came about as early as 
the second half of the second millennium BC following the fall of the Minoan Empire.
113
 The 
city-state enjoyed its first golden age in the ancient Mediterranean and its second flourishing in 
early modern Italy.
114
 However, there are two forms of governance that were more prominent 
than the city-state for most of Western history. The first is the multinational empire, which 
examples abound in history—from the ancient empires such as the Persian Empire and the 
Roman Empire to the modern ones such as the Holy Roman Empire and the Austrian Empire. 
The second—and more important for our discussion—is the monarchy, and in particular 
absolute monarchy, which was often based on ethnic or religious identifications. The doctrine of 
divine right of kings permeated throughout medieval and early modern Europe and exerted 
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powerful influence on the minds of the people and the rulers. It was God himself, they believed, 
that the kings’ authority came from, and thus questioning their legitimacy was tantamount to 
challenging God’s will—the ticket not only to a scaffold but also to eternal damnation.  
However, as the theological justification for the legitimacy of the prince came under 
growing attack by the intellectuals in early modern Europe, the rulers felt the need for a secular 
defense of their power.
115
 Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) was intended to provide exactly 
that—a defense of the sovereignty of the state over its subjects in secular terms, without resorting 
to Christian theology. His eloquent account of the origin of the sovereign state as the outcome of 
the necessary contract between the people and the ruler to avoid the worst-possible scenario put 
the tone and the structure for the later political theorists such as Locke and Rousseau. In many 
ways, Hobbes gave the modernity the foundation for the secular state that we are still familiar 
with. Although Hobbes’s defense of the state’s sovereignty was intended to safeguard absolute 
monarchy, it ironically became the foundation for the later nation-state.  
The rise of the nation-state as a dominant form of political governance is a complicated 
history, but many historians point to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-48) 116 as the turning point in the direction of the sovereign nation-state 
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system.
117
 The treaty declared the sovereignty of the state over its religion and territory. Political 
developments following the Treaty of Westphalia further accelerated the evolution of the state 
from the absolute monarchy to the democratic nation-state. For example, Glorious Revolution of 
1688 and the reign of William and Mary “marked the death of divine right monarchy in 
England.”118 More crucially, the American and French Revolutions at the end of the 18th century 
instigated popular movements across Europe and the fervor of nationalism in the 19
th
 century. In 
particular, the French Revolution, Hough writes, “became an archetype of the modern nation-
state because states more and more began to validate themselves as the political expression of 
defined people,” as opposed to that of the king or aristocrats.119 These democratic movements 
helped instill national identity in popular consciousness and resulted in the modern nation-state, 
which by mid 20
th
 century became largely the only legitimate form of governance in the 
world.
120 
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Its current dominance notwithstanding, the definition of “nation-state” is itself a 
complicated and controversial topic. It has meant different things ever since the word was first 
coined in the 19th century. Whereas we use the term as a synonym for ‘sovereign government’, 
to those who invented the term in the 19
th
 century, according to Philip White, ‘nation’ meant “an 
ethnic group which controlled its own sovereign government and, by implication, used that 
control to serve the interest of the dominant ethnic group.”121 
Thus, White claims, the term “nation-state” still appears to have two distinct meanings 
today: the sovereign government and the ethnic nation, “a group in which members share kinship 
(often fictive), language, perhaps a religion, and usually many customs.” 122 According to White, 
the advocates of the second view of the term insist “each ethnically homogenous group . . . is 
morally entitled to control its own sovereign government and to use control of the government to 
protect its purported ancestral purity, language, religion, and customs. This view became popular 
in the nineteenth century, lost much of its popularity after World War II, but has experienced a 
powerful revival since the end of the Cold War. It has antecedents going back to the Latin word 
for ‘birth’ and to Judeo-Christian scriptures.”123 Although the term is infused with historical 
racism and bigotry, the nation-state nonetheless continues to wield a singular influence in our 
political and moral universes as well as our own identity.  
 
The Unit of Community 
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The unit of polity often determines the extent to which we conceive and form our 
communities. While for someone living in the medieval period one’s conception of community 
might have seldom extended beyond one’s family members and rarely one’s township, we often 
conceive our own identity first and foremost by our nation-states. In large part, we consider 
ourselves as Americans, Koreans, or Mexicans before we are Texans, New Yorkers, or Aggies. 
And the way we conceive our community often dictates the scope of our sense of obligation. We 
are willing to share our resources with those whom we can relate to and empathize with. We feel 
more obligated to help fellow Americans in distress than those in remote countries.  
On the other hand, or perhaps because of this, we tend to shut our doors to, and feel less 
obligated to come to help, those people we regard, either consciously or unconsciously, 
essentially different from us. It is here the analogy of the feudalism cuts deep: As the aristocrat 
considered the commoners to be a fundamentally different kind of people than his, the people in 
rich countries also regard—often unconsciously, I hope—the people in developing countries or 
countries with vastly different traditions to be a fundamentally different people than themselves.  
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed this psychological and moral 
chasm between those considered to belong to different community. In the chapter on the 
difference in customs between Europe and America, Tocqueville writes that in aristocratic 
nations those within the same country considered themselves inherently different along the line 
of their classes. “When all the men of an aristocratic society take their irrevocable station 
according to profession, property, and birth,” Tocqueville writes, “the members of each social 
class experience a constant and active mutual sympathy from thinking of themselves as all 
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children of the same family.”124 However, “the same feeling for one another does not exist 
between the different classes,” he notes.  
In an aristocratic nation each caste has its own separate opinions, feelings, rights, customs, and 
style of living. Thus, its members are not like the members of all the other castes; they do not 
share the same modes of thought or feeling; they scarcely believe that they belong to the same 
human race.
125
  
Although political connection binds different classes together, Tocqueville writes, there is 
no true sense of connection or sense of moral obligation between the members of different class. 
“Feudal institutions aroused a sensitivity to the sufferings of particular men,” he writes, “[but] 
not to the miseries of the whole human race . . . for real sympathy exists only between those who 
are alike.”126 The same could be said between nations, Tocqueville believed. Writing how Cicero 
objected to the brutal practice done to some of his fellow Romans while remaining silent towards 
even more inhumane deeds done to foreigners, he remarks that from a Roman perspective, “a 
foreigner clearly belongs to a different human species from a Roman.”127   
Since the Roman period and the Middle Ages, and for that matter, 18
th
 century 
aristocracy, we have made enormous strides towards universal equality across human beings. 
However, the trace of the ancient apathy towards, if not discrimination against, foreigners—the 
expanded form of tribalism and the root of xenophobia—can still be found throughout Western 
countries today. Those who object to lenient immigration policies may argue in the name of 
one’s freedom of association and the right to self-determination. When we inquire further, 
however, I argue that we would find that their not wanting to associate with foreigners and be 
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political associates with them may stem from this indifference towards those outside their unit of 
community, that is, their nation-states (akin to the indifference of the aristocrats towards the 
commoners). Their apathy in turn may spring from their unconscious belief that those in 
developing countries belong to a fundamentally different caste.  
Therefore, the predominance of the nation-state as largely the only legitimate form of 
polity today translates into a severe constraint on our conception of community. Consequently, it 
becomes very difficult for us to conceive a form of community beyond our nation-states and to 
morally and psychologically connect with those people outside, as Ali Khan puts it, the national 
“geopsychological box.”128 Hence, unless we dismantle the psychological borders in our mind, 
we won’t be able to tear down the physical borders that keep the ‘others’ away. As Tocqueville 
said, people “display a reciprocal compassion for their sufferings and the laws of nations become 
gentler” as they become in their minds “more like one another.”129 But how could we be made 
“more like one another”? In other words, is there any philosophy that might help us to broaden 
our notion of community and perceive each other, regardless of one’s national origin, as 
coequals? It is this question I will try to address in the next section.   
 
 
4.2   The Cosmopolitan Argument for Open Borders 
 
 
I ended the last section with the question: what would it take for us to form a notion of 
community that goes beyond the national boundaries? In this section I will address this question 
in the course of my cosmopolitan argument for open borders, i.e., cosmopolitan world order. In 
                                                 
128
 Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States, 4. This is especially so in the age of terrorism and globalization, which 
have pushed some rich countries, like America, to turn ever more insular and isolationist. 
129
 Tocqueville, Democracy, 654. 
 51 
 
 
 
the course of my argument, I will rely on some of the strongest accounts of cosmopolitanism in 
Western philosophy: those from the ancient Stoics, Immanuel Kant, and Jürgen Habermas.  
 
The Stoics and Cosmopolitan Community  
The cosmopolitan philosophy of the ancient Stoics provides a moral foundation for a more 
universal world order.
130
 The Stoics believed that each and every one of us collectively formed 
one human community, linked to one another simply by virtue of being a human being. Lisa Hill 
writes that for the Stoics distinctions “based on ethnicity, gender and class are irrelevant. . . . 
Community is derived from the fact of our common humanity.”131 More precisely, it is human 
reason, according to the Stoics, that provides the foundation for the global community and make 
us fellow citizens. Human reason is “a portion of the divine in each of us,” and through 
participating in it we are able to discover the laws of nature that ruled the cosmopolitan 
community.
132
 Marcus Aurelius expresses this in an elaborate syllogistic argument: 
If the intellectual is common to all men, so is reason, in respect of which we are rational beings: if 
this is so, common also is the reason that commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is 
so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members 
of some political community; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. . . . And from this 
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common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and 
our capacity for law.
133
 
According to the Stoics, every one of us lives in two distinct communities, the local 
community and the cosmopolitan community, and it was to the latter that one was most 
obligated. Seneca writes in De Otio: “Let us take hold of the fact there are two communities—
the one, which is truly great and truly common, embracing gods and men, in which we look 
neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, 
the one to which we have been assigned by birth.”134 Zeno agrees with Seneca in the choice 
between the two communities: “We should not organize our daily lives around the city or the 
deme [an administrative unit], divided from one another by local schemes of justice, but we 
should regard all human begins as our fellow demesmen and fellow citizens.”135  
 The Stoics nonetheless did not dismiss the local community and particular loyalties as 
irrelevant or unethical. Instead, they recognized such local affiliations and feelings as all too 
natural. The Stoics, Hill writes, considered virtues to “consist in acceptance and performance of 
duties confluent with assigned station,” and they “sought to reconcile cosmopolitanism with the 
practical constraints of life by advising cosmopolitai not to wander the earth, dislocated and free 
from worldly care, but to accept and embrace the contingent identity which Zeus has thought fit 
to bestow on them.”136 For example, Epictetus exhorted his fellow Greeks to “do the duties of a 
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citizen yourself, to marry, bring up children, hold the customary offices . . . to live and go about 
your business in the place where you were born and were enrolled as a citizen.”137 
 Nevertheless, the Stoics consistently remind us that the duties to one’s surroundings 
should not be placed above the obligations to the cosmopolitan human community. While it is 
acceptable to give “what is near to us a special degree of attention and concern,” Nussbaum 
writes, the true Stoic “should always remember that these features of placement are incidental 
and that our most fundamental allegiance is to what is human.”138 Epictetus emphasized that “the 
greatest and most authoritative and most comprehensive of all governments is this one which is 
composed of men and God.”139  
Whether the Stoics envisioned a kind of world-state that would materialize their 
cosmopolitan aspirations is not clear. While Zeno did envision such cosmopolitan state in the 
Republic, the work has been lost and we know very little of it.
140
 We had to wait until the late 
Enlightenment for a more concrete vision of cosmopolitanism. 
 
Kant and the Cosmopolitan Alliance 
 Stoic cosmopolitanism left a deep mark on the great Enlightenment philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. While more known for his theoretical work, Kant was a champion of the 
international laws regulating individual nation-states. Of the several political works he wrote 
during his lifetime, the essay titled, “On Perpetual Peace,” proved most influential and enduring. 
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A political treatise on international order, the essay aims to end all future wars by proposing a 
federation of all nation-states in the form of a military and economic alliance which primary goal 
was to prevent the outbreak of war. A “deeply optimistic document,” as Brian Orend calls it, the 
essay purports to provide nothing short of a “recipe for peace.”141  
 As the title indicates, Kant sets himself for an ambitious project of coming up with a 
blueprint for perpetual peace in the world. He believed such a global peace was indeed possible, 
though it would not come naturally. Kant held a Hobbesian understanding of human nature, 
according to which the natural state for humans was constant conflict and mistrust of one 
another. “The condition of peace among human beings who live beside each other is not a 
natural situation,” Kant writes, “for the natural state is rather a condition of war. In other words, 
although there is not always an outbreak of hostilities, nevertheless there is a constant threat that 
this will occur.”142 Given such hostile human nature, Kant argues, the state of peace “must 
therefore be established.”143  
Kant’s grand solution for establishing global peace was to form a cosmopolitan alliance 
consisting of all nation-states. He begins with an argument that the condition of peace was an 
“immediate obligation” dictated by reason. 144 Then he argues that such a peace would not be 
possible “without a compact of nations among themselves . . . a special form of alliance, which 
one could call an alliance for peace,” which purpose was “to put an end to all wars forever.”145 
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Such an alliance, Kant argues, would “maintain and guarantee the freedom of a state for itself 
and at the same time the freedom of other states in the alliance.”146 
However, would nation-states voluntarily come together to form a cosmopolitan alliance? 
Kant argues that as the world becomes increasingly globalized, nation-states would be compelled 
for such an arrangement. “The greater or lesser social interactions among the nations of the 
earth, which have been constantly increasing everywhere, have now spread so far that a violation 
of rights in one part of the earth is felt everywhere,” Kant writes.  
Hence, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is not a fantastic, hysterical way of imagining rights, but a 
necessary completion of the unwritten code of both national and international law for the public 
rights of human beings generally and so for perpetual peace.
147
 
In addition, Kant believed that the egoistic human nature will further necessitate a 
cosmopolitan alliance. Nature, he writes, “uses mutual self-interest to link together states,” as 
well as “the spirit of commerce, which cannot co-exist with war and which sooner or later seizes 
every nation.” 148 Kant concludes that “through the mechanisms in human inclinations, nature 
guarantees perpetual peace.”149 
Kant’s ideas were taken seriously and eventually sowed a seed for the later formation of 
the United Nations, the primary purpose of which was to establish global peace, as the 
philosopher envisioned. Consequently, it is to Kant we owe the unprecedented longevity of the 
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postwar peace. Nonetheless, while there may not have been an outright war between major 
powers since the formation of the UN, there have been and still are numerous small-scale 
conflicts wreaking havoc in many parts of the world, producing millions of refugees around the 
world.
150
 The problem is exacerbated by the growing right-wing nationalism in many rich 
countries including the United States and Germany. In short, Kant’s plan for perpetual peace 
might have achieved, for the time being, its seeming goal, but it has failed to address the current, 
no less significant, transnational challenges around immigration. One of his contemporary 
disciples, Jürgen Habermas takes up this challenge.   
 
Habermas and Cosmopolitan Solidarity 
 One of the leading intellectuals alive,
151
 Habermas has also been one of the strongest and 
most eloquent contemporary proponents of cosmopolitanism. In The Postnational Constellation, 
a collection of his political essays, Habermas advances his cosmopolitan vision of the world 
order after the current nation-state system. He argues that the nation-state system had served us 
well but is no longer sustainable in the era of 21
st
 century globalization,
152
 which requires an 
alternative political system that would better meet the contemporary challenges. Globalization, 
Habermas argues, “introduce[s] us to another perspective, from which we see the growing 
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interdependence of social arenas, communities of risks, and the networks of shared fate ever 
more clearly.”153  
  Habermas believes globalization calls for a more cosmopolitan world-order. While he 
does not give a detailed blueprint for such global system, he suggests a few guidelines as to how 
it would come about. First, he argues that the movement for the cosmopolitan reform should 
originate from the bottom up—from “social movements and non-governmental organizations 
[and] the active members of a civil society that stretches beyond national borders,” rather than 
the governments and the elites.
154
 The reason has to do with how democracy works:  
Only the transformed consciousness of citizens can pressure global actors to change their own 
self-understanding sufficiently to begin to see themselves as members of an international 
community who are compelled to cooperate with one another, and hence to take one another’s 
interest into account.
155
  
For such grassroots movement to take shape and gain political traction, Habermas argues, we 
need to first foster a collective consciousness that would transcend the national boundaries, and 
Habermas calls it the “cosmopolitan solidarity,” a collective moral awakening to the fact that we 
all belong to one global community regardless of one’s national origin.156  
  Nonetheless, Habermas admits that it is no small task to forge such solidarity. It is indeed 
a very difficult process, he writes, “to change one’s own sense of identity and community.”157 
Furthermore, the cosmopolitan solidarity, Habermas writes, “would certainly be weaker and less 
binding than the civil solidarity that developed within nation-states.” 158 And yet he reminds the 
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readers that humans have undergone such transformation of community throughout history and 
thus the one from the current nation-state system to a more cosmopolitan system is also possible:  
The human population has long since coalesced into an unwilling community of shared risk. 
Under this pressure, it is thus quite plausible that the great, historically momentous dynamic of 
abstraction from local, to dynastic, to national to democratic consciousness would take one more 
step forward.
159
 
 In sum, Habermas argues that globalization and its challenges have rendered the nation-
state system an outdated platform upon which to arrange our international order, and calls for a 
new political model that would broaden our consciousness and the notion of community. Such 
political reform, Habermas contends, should start at the level of transnational NGOs and 
grassroots movements, which in turn would require cosmopolitan solidarity.
160
 While Habermas 
does not, perhaps cannot, provide a more concrete blueprint for a cosmopolitan political system, 
his diagnosis of our contemporary world and his general guidance nonetheless gives us a good 
starting point to imagine and believe in a more cosmopolitan world-order beyond the current 
nation-state system. 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have argued that (1) opening borders will require broadening our 
conception of community; (2) accordingly, the nation-state system poses a serious challenge in 
the path to open borders by limiting one’s notion of community within national boundaries; and, 
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(3) therefore, in order to form a much larger sense of community we must move past the current 
nation-state system toward a more cosmopolitan world order. Then I presented three important 
accounts of cosmopolitan community.  
  First, the ancient Stoics give a moral case for the global community based on our shared 
humanity. According to this account, our obligations to this cosmopolitan community, in which 
all human beings are fellow citizens, outweigh our obligations to our local community, formed 
through birth, religion, ethnicity, region, etc. Kant’s account provides a more concrete political 
vision of cosmopolitan world order connected through a cosmopolitan alliance of all nation-
states. Then I discussed Habermas’ argument against the current nation-state system, which he 
argues does not work in this era of globalization, as well as his argument for a grassroots-based 
cosmopolitan world order, achieved through cultivation of cosmopolitan solidarity.
161
   
  I agree with Habermas that the 19
th
 century nation-state system does not fit the current 
world we live in. As he argues, globalization has led us to face the extremely complicated and 
connected world, whether we like it or not, in which the previous ignorance of the remote 
sufferings of those on the other side of the globe cannot get us off the ethical hook anymore or 
resist on the basis of individual rights. The tide is manifest: technology such as Google and 
Facebook that connects the world will continue to develop at a neck-break speed; unless human 
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incidental contingencies such as one’s nation, race, and religion. Would this scenario immediately lead to abolition 
of border control? While the answer is bound to be speculative, I firmly believe it will lead to something very close 
to open borders. People in rich countries will be convinced they have obligation to come to help, or at least not to 
protest against, their fellow global citizens in desperate need—just like the people in Texas felt toward the residents 
in Louisiana coming to Texas en masse for refuge when Hurricane Katrina devastated their home in 2005. When 
people consider each other as co-members of the same community they deeply care about, they will see each other 
as coequal rather than different, as teammates rather than rivals, as fellow compatriots rather than enemy other, and 
they will be more generous to one another, especially, but not exclusively, in times of need. William Deresiewicz 
writes, “The only way to treat somebody as an equal is to realize that that’s exactly what they are.” Unlike the 
nation-state system, the cosmopolitan view of community will allow this realization to occur. Deresiewicz, Excellent 
Sheep, 222. 
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nature suddenly changes for the better, local conflicts and dictatorships around the world will 
continue to exist creating refugees and forced migrants at the speed on par with technology, 
which fuels the exaggerated hope and mirage of overflowing opportunities in rich countries in 
the mind of those oppressed in developing countries, all the while making international migration 
increasingly easier and cheaper. It is not only unwise but also dangerous to fight against this 
global tide. Doing so amounts to, as a Korean saying goes, throwing an egg against a rock. While 
it will not solve even an inch of the problem around transnational migration, it will only create 
unnecessary sufferings and human rights violations on the part of the weak and oppressed.  
  Rather than holding onto the outdated mode of organizing ourselves around the national 
boundaries, we should embrace the global tide and strive to reform the status quo in both our 
national and local politics. We should learn from the civil rights movement in the 60’s and 70’s 
and launch a cosmopolitan movement calling for a national and transnational moral awakening. 
We should go back to the ancient Stoics for guidance. We should start by realizing that every one 
of us in this world belongs, first and foremost, to the community called humanity that exceeds 
our national and local ties. That we are all equal human beings.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Throughout the thesis, I have discussed various issues from the U.S. border policy and 
the state’s right to control immigration to the nation-state system and cosmopolitanism. In 
Chapter Two, I discussed the cost-benefit analysis of the U.S. immigration and border policy and 
its impact of the migrants themselves. In Chapter Three, I discussed the open borders debate, and 
in particular Walzer’s argument for the state’s right to control immigration and Carens’ argument 
for open borders. In Chapter Four, I discussed the relationship between open borders and the 
nation-state system and advocated for a more cosmopolitan world order. What holds these issues 
together is the theme of human community. Each side of the debate—whether on the current 
immigration policy, ethics of open borders, or legitimacy of the nation-state system—grounds 
their argument on the appeal to the legitimacy and the needs of their own community, however 
small or large. The difference of positions can boil down to different priorities: the interest of the 
national community vs. that of the cosmopolitan community. It is the old Stoic dilemma. 
   While my study merely scratches the surface of the debates we have discussed, it is my 
hope that it will inspire further interest in each of them: whether the U.S. border policy is cost-
effective and humane; whether the state has a right to enforce its borders; whether the nation-
state system can still be part of the solution of the current international challenges; or whether it 
is part of the problem itself. My own conclusion is that the cosmopolitan conception of 
community can be the starting point toward world-wide political reform.  
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